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Abstract
As fallout from the global financial crisis intensified in October 2008, governments around
the world sought to implement stabilization measures in order to calm and protect their
domestic markets. While not directly exposed to the subprime mortgage crisis, the Kingdom
of the Netherlands announced the creation of the Dutch Credit Guarantee Scheme (the
Guarantee Scheme) on October 13, 2008, to boost confidence in interbank lending markets
and to ensure the flow of credit to Dutch households and companies. In establishing this
program, the Dutch State Treasury Agency of the Ministry of Finance (DSTA) committed €200
billion to support the issuance of debt to be guaranteed by the government. Dutch financial
institutions meeting liquidity and solvency requirements enforced by De Nederlandsche
Bank, including foreign subsidiaries established in the Netherlands with substantial business
in the country, were eligible to apply for coverage under the Guarantee Scheme. Initially, only
newly issued “plain vanilla” commercial paper, certificates of deposit, and fixed- or floatingrate medium-term notes with maturities of between three months and three years could be
guaranteed. Additionally, debt instruments would need to be denominated in euros, US
dollars, or pounds sterling. Between October 23, 2008, and December 1, 2009, the Guarantee
Scheme was utilized by six Dutch financial institutions for a total utilization of €54.2 billion.
No guaranteed debt was issued after December 1, 2009. The issuance window, though
originally set to expire December 31, 2009, was extended twice, to December 31, 2010. No
institutions defaulted on any guaranteed debt.
Keywords: The Netherlands, short-term debt, medium-term debt, credit institutions,
government guarantee

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to bank debt guarantee
programs.
1
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Dutch Credit Guarantee Scheme
At a Glance
As fallout from the global financial crisis intensified
in October 2008, governments around the world
sought to implement stabilization measures to both
calm and protect their domestic economies.
Financial institutions in the Netherlands, while not
as exposed as those in other countries to
disturbances in the US markets, suffered from
liquidity shortages stemming from a sharp decrease
in interbank lending. In response, the Dutch State
Treasury Agency of the Ministry of Finance (DSTA),
in cooperation with De Nederlandsche Bank,
announced the creation of the Dutch Credit
Guarantee Scheme (the ‘Guarantee Scheme’) on
October 13, 2008, for the purpose of granting
government guarantees to banks and financial
institutions issuing medium-term debt.

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: To ensure liquidity for Dutch financial
institutions and, by extension, Dutch households and
businesses, through the provision of State guarantees
on non-subordinated, medium-term debt
Announcement Date

October 13, 2008

Operational Date

October 23, 2008

Date of First Guaranteed
Loan Issuance

October 23, 2008,
approx.

Issuance Window
Expiration Date

Originally December 31,
2009; later extended
twice, to December 31,
2010

Program Size

€200 billion

Usage

€54.2 billion by six

The program was officially implemented on October
Dutch financial
23, 2008, when the DSTA committed €200 billion to
institutions in total
support the issuance of debt to be guaranteed by the
Outcomes
No defaults
government. Dutch financial institutions, including
Up to one year after
foreign subsidiaries with substantial business in the Notable Features
default for the
country, that met solvency and liquidity
guarantee to be realized
requirements were eligible to participate. Eligible
upon
debt initially included non-complex unsecured loans
limited to plain-vanilla commercial paper,
certificates of deposit, and fixed- or floating-rate medium-term notes. Debt instruments needed to
have maturities of between three months and three years and be denominated in euros, US dollars
(USD), or pounds sterling (GBP). These criteria were later modified on July 7, 2009, to include all
senior unsecured debt instruments denominated in euros, USD, or GBP with maturities of greater
than three months and up to five years. In accordance with European Central Bank (ECB)
recommendations, participation fees were assessed based on an institution’s creditworthiness and
the maturity of the debt to be guaranteed.
Between October 23, 2008, and December 1, 2009, the Guarantee Scheme was utilized by six Dutch
financial institutions for a total utilization of €54.2 billion. The issuance window was set to expire
December 31, 2009; it was extended twice to close on December 31, 2010. No participating
institution defaulted.
Summary Evaluation
There has not been much formal evaluation of the Guarantee Scheme. However, it has been viewed
by one source as a successful lender of “last resort” facility for Dutch financial institutions looking
to bolster their liquidity and interbank lending positions.
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Dutch Credit Guarantee Scheme: The Netherlands Context
$849.1 billion in 2007
$952.2 billion in 2008

GDP
(SAAR, Nominal GDP
in LCU converted to
USD)

Source: Bloomberg
$51,733 in 2007
$57,644 in 2008

GDP per capita
(SAAR, Nominal GDP
in LCU converted to
USD)

Source: Bloomberg

Sovereign credit
rating (5-year senior
debt)

As of Q4, 2007:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaau
S&P: AAA
As of Q4, 2008:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaau
S&P: AAA
Source: Bloomberg

Size of banking
system

$1.0 trillion in total assets in 2007
$1.1 trillion In total assets in 2008
Source: Bloomberg

Size of banking
system as a
percentage of GDP
Size of banking
system as a
percentage of
financial system

120.2% in 2007
120.3% in 2008
Source: Bloomberg
Data not available for 2007/2008
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development
Database
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of banking system

Foreign involvement
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94.0% of total banking assets in 2007
93.0% of total banking assets in 2008
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development
Database
10.0% of total banking assets in 2007
2.0% of total banking assets in 2008
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development
Database

Government
ownership of banking
system
Existence of deposit
insurance

Data not available for 2007/2008
Source: World Bank Group
Data not available for 2007
100% insurance on deposits up to $57,000 in midSeptember 2008
Source: OECD
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Overview

Background
As fallout from the global financial crisis intensified in October 2008, governments
worldwide acted swiftly to calm and protect their domestic markets. The Netherlands sought
to address the liquidity problems that its “fundamentally sound and viable financial
institutions” faced under the extraordinary circumstances (European Commission 2008). In
implementing the Dutch Credit Guarantee Scheme, the government hoped to ensure the flow
of credit to households and businesses at a time when interbank lending had become
severely restricted. To support specific institutions in need of further assistance between
late 2008 and 2013, Dutch authorities later enacted individual recapitalization and
restructuring measures for banks. It was expected that the implementation of the Guarantee
Scheme would not only encourage interbank lending at a time when the market for mediumterm, non-guaranteed loans had “dried up,” but that the measure itself would help to stabilize
the Dutch economy in the midst of the global financial crisis (European Commission 2008).
Program Description
The Dutch government authorized plans for the creation of the Guarantee Scheme—whose
design was modeled after the Unied Kingdom’s Credit Guarantee Scheme—on October 13,
2008. A week later, on October 21, 2008, the Dutch Ministry of Finance notified the European
Commission of its plans to implement the Guarantee Scheme in response to recent
disruptions in the global credit markets. The program was officially implemented on October
23, 2008. Having found its features to be in accordance with State aid rules, the European
Commission granted approval for the Guarantee Scheme on October 30, 2008.
The Dutch program was jointly administered by the Dutch State Treasury Agency of the
Ministry of Finance and De Nederlandsche Bank, the Netherlands’ central bank. According to
the original terms of the program, the DSTA commited €200 billion to support the issuance
of debt guaranteed by the government. Participation in the voluntary, opt-in program was
open to Dutch financial institutions meeting solvency and liquidity standards according to
the Dutch Financial Markets Supervision Act of 2006, including foreign subsidiaries
established in the Netherlands with “substantial business in the country” (European
Commission 2008). Additionally, only one institution in a group was allowed to apply for the
Guarantee Scheme. De Nederlandsche Bank bore responsibility for ensuring that these
standards and requirements were met prior to participation in the Guarantee Scheme.
Initially, only debts with maturities of more than three months and less than three years
were eligible for coverage under the Guarantee Scheme. Qualifying debt instruments
included new, non-complex senior unsecured loans—limited to plain-vanilla commercial
paper, certificates of deposit, and fixed- or floating-rate medium-term notes that could be
redeemed in a single payment. The terms of the debt instruments could not include any
provisions for cross-default, cross-acceleration of default, or call option on the principal
(Ministry of Finance 2008). Though there were no minimum amounts specified for the
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issuance of individual guarantees, debt instruments were required to be denominated in
euros, US dollars, or pounds sterling.
Interested institutions meeting solvency and liquidity requirements applied through the
DSTA to issue guaranteed debt. Both the government and the participant then signed a
Guarantee Certificate, a contractual agreement specifying each party’s obligations under the
Guarantee Scheme. For instance, only one guarantee could be associated with a single debt
issuance, and the Dutch government reserved the right to cancel coverage under the
Guarantee Scheme if either the terms of the debt were amended in any way or if the debt
were issued after the cut-off date specified in the Guarantee Certificate. Additionally, the
participating bank was required to pay a termination fee to the DSTA if it failed to issue the
guaranteed debt by the cut-off date agreed upon with the Dutch government.
Participation fees consisted of a flat fee of 50 basis points on an annual basis and a variable
fee determined according to an individual bank’s creditworthiness as well as the maturity of
the debt to be guaranteed. The fee schedule was designed in accordance with the European
Commission’s “Recommendations on government guarantees on bank debt” of October 20,
2008.
The DSTA imposed restrictions on individual participation by limiting any bank’s usage to
the amount of existing debt maturing between October 23, 2008, and December 31, 2009.
Participating banks also had to comply with a series of conditions designed to prevent abuse
of the Guarantee Scheme, including limits on marketing the Guarantee Scheme as a
commercial advantage, executive compensation, and severances packages. There was also a
limit placed on growth in balance sheet volume, which was not to exceed the higher
percentage of “1) the annual growth of nominal GDP in the Netherlands in the previous year,
2) the average historical growth of the balance sheets in the Netherlands for the period
1987–2007, or 3) the average growth in balance sheet volume of the EU banking sector in
the previous six months (European Commission 2008).
Upon the first event of default, the Dutch government assumed responsibility for 100% of
principal and interest and paid the lender within three months of the date of default. The
DSTA was allowed to extend this payment date up to three times under extraordinary
circumstances.
On July 7, 2009, the Ministry of Finance notified the European Commission of modifications
to the original terms of the Guarantee Scheme. Under the amended conditions, eligibility was
expanded to include all senior unsecured debt instruments with maturities of up to five
years. Relatedly, the DSTA committed up to €66.6 billion (i.e., one third of the total budget)
for debt instruments with maturities of greater than three years; individual caps for banks
issuing guaranteed debt with maturities of greater than three years was further limited to
€22.2 billion (i.e., a third of a third of the total budget).
The July 7, 2009, modifications also provided more detailed requirements for participation
regarding corporate governance and compensation. Rather than unconditionally restricting
executive bonuses and other incentives, participating banks would need to introduce and
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maintain a sustainable remuneration policy, ensure that severance payments for members
of the Board were limited to one year’s fixed salary, and adhere to the provisions of the Dutch
Corporate Governance Code when distributing bonus packages.
On December 17, 2009, the Ministry of Finance notified the European Commission of further
modifications to the Guarantee Scheme. First, the issuance window was extended from
December 31, 2009 to June 30, 2010. Second, the flat fee included in the participation fee
increased from 50 basis points (bps) to 70 bps for all guaranteed debt instruments. For debt
instruments with a maturity of over 12 months, the variable fee also increased as a result of
the change in reference period used to calculate credit default swap (CDS) spreads.3
On June 29, 2010, the Ministry of Finance notified the European Commission of two
additional modifications to the Guarantee Scheme prompted by the European Commission’s
April 30, 2010 guidelines for the phase-out of guarantee programs. First, the fixed
participation fee increased for all credit rating categories according to a progressive scale,
ranging from 75 bps for banks with triple-A ratings to 110 bps for banks with ratings lower
than A minus. Additionally, the Ministry of Finance needed to undertake a viability review
for each institution whose total outstanding guaranteed debt (as of July 1, 2010) exceeded
both a ratio of 5% of total liabilities and a total of €500 million. The Ministry of Finance was
then be required to submit such reports to the European Commission within three months
of a new debt issuance or rollover by a participating bank (European Commission 2010a).
Outcomes
Although the Guarantee Scheme issuance window was originally set to expire on December
31, 2009, it was prolonged two times, in each case for a period of six months, closing on
December 31, 2010.
Between October 23, 2008, and December 1, 2009, the Guarantee Scheme was utilized by six
Dutch financial institutions.4 These were not exclusively the six largest banks in the
Netherlands— although large banks SNS, ING, and Fortis accounted for well over half of
utilization—but rather the ones facing the greatest liquidity pressures (Leal 2011).
LeasePlan Corp. N.V.. a fleet management company held mainly by Volkswagen Group, and
Achmea Hypotheekbank N.V., a mortgage company, complied with the conditions set forth
in the original terms of the Guarantee Scheme and were deemed eligible to issue guaranteed
debt despite their non-bank status.
The following table (Figure 1) details the usage of the Guarantee Scheme up to December 1,
2009, after which no debt was issued under the program. This slowdown was due in part to
the improving conditions in global markets and, consequently, the steady return of non-

The ECB’s “Recommendations” previously referenced the period between January 1, 2007, to August 31,
2008, but the Netherlands updated the reference period to reflect CDS spreads calculated for the period
between March 1, 2008, to November 1, 2009.
4 Achmea Hypotheekbank N.V., Fortis Bank Ned. (Holding) N.V., ING Bank N.V., LeasePlan Corp. N.V., NIBC
Bank N.V., and SNS Bank N.V.
3
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guaranteed debt issuance as well as the “revival of equity issuance aimed at market
investors” (Levy and Schich 2010).
Figure 1: Operation of the Guarantee Scheme up to December 1, 2009
Total assigned
(€ billion)
2.2

Total issued
(€ billion)
2.2

Total assigned
(%)
4.1

Total issued
(%)
4.2

SNS

5.7

5.7

10.6

11.0

NIBC

6.8

6.4

12.6

12.3

LeasePlan

7.6

7.2

14.1

13.9

ING

12.8

12.4

23.7

23.9

Fortis

18.9

18.0

35.0

34.7

Total

54.0

51.9

100.0

100.0

Achmea
Hypotheekbank

Source: Dutch Ministry of Finance.

II.

Key Design Decisions

1. The Guarantee Scheme was implemented by the Dutch government as one of many
stabilization measures announced in response to the global financial crisis.
Other interventions, implemented independently throughout an extended period spanning
from late 2008 through 2013, included individual capitalization, investment, and
restructuring measures for major Dutch banks such as Aegon, ING, and SNS REAAL. A
majority of the later actions were taken in response to deteriorating conditions exacerbated
by the European sovereign debt crisis.
2. The program drew its legal basis from the Dutch Financial Markets Supervision Act
of 2006.
Existing Dutch law thus provided the authority for the Guarantee Scheme.
3. In accordance with State aid rules, European Commission approval was required
for the implementation of the Guarantee Scheme.
The European Commission authorized the Guarantee Scheme on October 30, 2008. As
discussed in more detail below, the need to structure the Guarantee Scheme in such a way
as to ensure EC approval significantly influenced the design of certain program features.
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4. Up to €200 billion could be guaranteed under the program.
Program documents do not provide a specific rationale for this amount.
5. Eligibility for the Guarantee Scheme was restricted to Dutch banks that met
liquidity and solvency requirements.
The Guarantee Scheme as announced provided for eligibility for all banks with substantial
operations in the Netherlands. Banks would have to meet certain liquidity and solvency
requirements as specified in the Dutch Financial Markets Supervision Act of 2006. Included
among eligible institutions were foreign subsidiaries established in the Netherlands deemed
by De Nederlandsche Bank to have met the substantial operations test (European
Commission 2008a). Applicants to the program needed explicit approval from De
Nederlandsche Bank before applying for coverage under the Guarantee Scheme.
As noted in the Outcomes section, LeasePlan Corp. N.V., a fleet management company held
mainly by Volkswagen Group, and Achmea Hypotheekbank N.V., a mortgage company,
complied with the conditions set forth in the original terms of the Guarantee Scheme and
were deemed eligible to issue guaranteed debt despite their non-bank status.
6. Initially, new non-complex senior unsecured loans limited to plain-vanilla
commercial paper, certificates of deposits, and fixed- or floating-rate bullet
medium-term notes were eligible for coverage under the Guarantee Scheme.
On July 7, 2009, the European Commission approved a request by the Dutch Ministry of
Finance to expand eligibility to include all senior unsecured debt instruments.
7. Initially, debt ranging in maturity from three months to three years could be issued
under the Guarantee Scheme.
The July 7, 2009, modifications expanded eligibility to include debt with maturities up to five
years. Relatedly, the Dutch government committed one third of the total budget (i.e., €66.6
billion) for the granting of guarantees for debt with maturities over three years. An
individual limit of one third of this designated amount (i.e., €22.2 billion) was imposed on
banks issuing guaranteed debt with maturities greater than three years.
8. Eligibility was restricted to debt denominated in euros, US dollars, and pounds
sterling.
Program documents do not provide a specific rationale for limiting eligibility to these
currencies.
9. The Ministry of Finance imposed individual caps according to the amount of debt
already issued by each participating institution.
Participating institutions were not allowed to issue guaranteed debt in excess of the amount
of existing debt maturing between October 23, 2008, and December 31, 2009.
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10. The fee for issuing debt pursuant to the Guarantee Scheme varied based on the
soundness of the issuing institution and the maturity of the debt guaranteed.
The guarantee fee was determined according to the guidelines presented in the European
Central Bank’s “Recommendations on government guarantees on bank debt” of October 20,
2008. Guarantees for debts with any length of maturity incurred a flat fee of 50 bps. In
addition, variable charges for guaranteed debt with maturities over 12 months were
calculated using the lower of either the median five-year CDS spread for that institution from
January 1, 2007, to August 31, 2008, or the median five-year CDS spread based on a
comparison with peer group members with a similar rating over the same period. For banks
without representative CDS spreads but with a credit rating, fees were calculated in
accordance with peer group members’ ratings over the same period. Banks without either
CDS spreads or credit ratings incurred fees based on De Nederlandsche Bank’s regulatory
assessment (European Commission 2008).
Participation fees were later increased with the December 17, 2009 (see Figure 2),
modification and prolongation of the Guarantee Scheme. The flat fee for guaranteeing debt
of any maturity increased from 50 bps to 70 bps. Additionally, the variable fees for
guaranteeing debt instruments with maturities over 12 months increased due to a change in
the period used to calculate CDS spreads, from January 1, 2007 to August 31, 2008 as
referenced in the European Central Bank’s “Recommendations on government guarantees
on bank debt,” to March 1, 2008–November 1, 2009 (European Commission 2009a).
Figure 2: Participation Fees as of December 17, 2009
Rating

Fixed fee

Total fee

70 bps

Variable fee
(CDS spreads)
53 bps

AAA
AA

70 bps

68 bps

138 bps

A

70 bps

73 bps

143 bps

Other

70 bps

93 bps

163 bps

123 bps

Source: Dutch Ministry of Finance.
On June 29, 2010, the Dutch Ministry of Finance once again increased the fixed component
of the participation fee for all credit rating categories according to a progressive scale (see
Figure 3), ranging from 75 basis points for banks with triple-A ratings to 110 basis points for
banks with ratings lower than A minues (European Commission 2010b). This followed new
guidelines from the European Commission issued on April 30, 2010, that called for an
increase in guarantee fees for programs still in operation, with the objectives of better
matching market conditions and incentivizing firms to shift to non-guarantee issuance as
soon as possible.
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Figure 3: Participation Fees as of June 29, 2010
Rating

Fixed Fee

AAA
AA
A or A+
AOther

75 bps
80 bps
85 bps
90 bps
110 bps

Variable Fee
(CDS spreads)
53 bps
63 bps
73 bps
73 bps
93 bps

Total fee
128 bps
148 bps
158 bps
163 bps
203 bps

Source: Dutch Ministry of Finance.
All fees were to be paid on annual basis within forty days of the issuance of guaranteed debt.
A bank that failed to issue debt that it had successfully applied to have covered under the
Guarantee Scheme was subject to a termination fee. This termination fee was equal to the
participation fee that was to have been charged for each debt issuance.
11. The Ministry of Finance imposed broad conditions for participation, including
restrictions on growth in balance sheet volume, executive compensation, and
severance packages and the marketing of the Guarantee Scheme.
Guidance issued by the European Commission in October 2008 on the creation of credit
guarantee programs called for the inclusion in programs of a set of safeguards “to minimize
. . . distortions and the potential abuse of the preferential situations of beneficiaries brought
about by a State guarantee” and “to avoid moral hazard.” This guidance did not specify
exactly what safeguards a program should include, but required “an adequate combination”
of elements including restrictions on advertising based on the guarantee, balance sheet
growth, share buybacks and executive compensation some of which the Dutch adopted.
(European Commission 2008).
Growth in balance sheet volume while taking part in the Guarantee Scheme was not to exceed
the higher of the following:
1) The annual growth in nominal GDP in the Netherlands in the previous year;
2) The average historical growth in balance sheets in the Dutch banking sector for the
period 1987–2007;
3) The average percent growth in balance sheet volume of the European Union banking
sector in the previous six months (European Commission 2009b).
Although executive compensation and severance package increases were initially restricted
unconditionally, the July 7, 2009, modifications to the Guarantee Scheme outlined more
specific requirements whereby participating banks would be required to:
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1) Introduce and maintain a sustainable remuneration policy;
2) Ensure that the severance payments for members of the Board of Directors would
be limited to one year’s fixed salary;
3) Adhere to the guidelines set forth by the Dutch Corporate Governance Code when
calculating bonuses (European Commission 2009b).
12. As of July 1, 2010, certain participating banks were required to undergo a
comprehensive review of their activities under the Guarantee Scheme.
Based on guidelines issued by the European Commission for guarantee programs to be
continued beyond June 30, 2010, the Dutch authorities instituted a mandatory viability
review for each bank whose total outstanding guaranteed debt as of July 1, 2010 exceeded
both a ratio of 5% of total liabilities and a total of €500 million. The Ministry of Finance was
required to submit such reports to the European Commission within three months of a new
debt issuance or rollover by a participating bank. This requirement was motivated by the
European Commission’s belief that market conditions had stabilized sufficiently by mid2010 such that a “persistent failure to obtain a considerable proportion of the funding
needed without government guarantees may indicate a lack of confidence in the viability of
a bank’s business model.” Thus, continued heavy reliance on government guarantees
necessitated an examination of the institution’s business in the Commission’s view
(European Commission 2010a).
13. Upon the first event of default, the Dutch State Treasury Authority was required to
fulfill its guarantee obligations to a participating institution within three months.
In the event that a participating institution defaulted on its guaranteed debts, the Dutch State
Treasury Authority would assume responsibility for paying principal and interest through
maturity and pay all obligations within three months of the date of default. The government
reserved the right to extend its payment date up to three times under extraordinary
circumstances (European Commission 2008).
Per the original terms of the Guarantee Scheme, the guaranteed debt would have to provide
for the repayment of principal in a single amount. The terms of the debt instruments were
not permitted to include any allowance for cross-default, cross-acceleration of default, or any
call option on the principal (Ministry of Finance 2008).
14. The Guarantee Scheme issuance window was initially set to expire on December
31, 2009, before being extended to December 31, 2010.
Although the original terms specified an end date of December 31, 2009, the Guarantee
Scheme issuance window was prolonged for two periods of six months each. The program’s
issuance window expired on December 31, 2010.
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III. Evaluation
It has been hypothesized that Dutch banks considered the Guarantee Scheme to be a facility
of “last resort,” and that, given peak utilization totaled only a quarter of the €200 billion
budget, they were successful in finding alternative sources of emergency funding (Leal
2011). For instance, according to Leal, the diversity of beneficiaries suggests that large,
multinational groups may have simultaneously accessed guarantee schemes in several
countries via their foreign subsidiaries (Leal 2011). The fact that four of the six financial
institutions issued less guaranteed debt than they had been assigned by the DSTA also
indicates that institutions may have only applied to the Guarantee Scheme for
supplementary aid (Leal 2011.).
All guaranteed debt was issued prior to November 2009, so it is unclear whether the lack of
program utilization had to do with the fee increases specified in the December 2009 term
modifications (Leal 2011).
Leal also found evidence for the positive effect of guaranteed debt issuance on the credit
spreads of Dutch bonds, particularly for senior unsecured debt issues and subordinated debt
issues (Leal 2011). However, Leal finds that this may have been accompanied by the
crowding out of non-guaranteed issuances.
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scheme..
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/228022_883613_26_2.pdf.
Steunmaatregelen N 379/2009 en NN 16-2009 - Nederland; Garantieregeling ten behoeve
van banken in Nederland (European Commission 2009) – State Aid document describing the
terms and conditions of the 2009 extensions of the credit guarantee scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/232059_974370_22_2.pdf.
State Aid N 669/2009 – Netherlands; Prolongation of the Dutch Guarantee Scheme
(European Commission 2009) – State Aid document describing the terms and conditions of the
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2009
prolongation
of
the
credit
guarantee
scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/EC_State_Aid_Prolongation_
Dec_2009.pdf.
State Aid N 238/2010 – The Netherlands; Extension of the Dutch Guarantee Scheme
(European Commission 2010) – State Aid document describing the terms and conditions of the
2010
extension
of
the
credit
guarantee
scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/EC_State_Aid_Extension_Jun
e_2010.pdf.
Legal/Regulatory Guidance
Act of 28 September 2006, on Rules Regarding the Financial Markets and Their Supervision
(Kingdom of the Netherlands 2007) – Unofficial translation of government regulation cited in
the
design
of
the
2008
credit
guarantee
scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Translation_FSMA_Wet%20
op%20het%20financieel%20toezicht_Nov_2007_0.pdf.
Recommendations of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank on government
guarantees for bank debt (European Commission 2008) – Guidelines issued by the ECB for all
EU
governments
planning
to
design
a
credit
guarantee
scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/recommendations_on_guara
ntees%20ecb.pdf.
The Application of State Aid Rules to Government Guarantee Schemes Covering Bank Debt
to Be Issued after 30 June 2010 (European Commission 2010) – State Aid document
describing common rules for the implementation of credit guarantee schemes in the EU.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/phase_out_bank_guarantees
%2030%20April%202010.pdf.
Press Releases/Announcements
Implementation of Dutch Credit Guarantee Scheme (10/21/2008) – Press release published
by the Dutch central bank regarding the initial launch of the credit guarantee scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/De_Dederlandsche_Bank_Im
plementation_Dutch_Credit_Guarantee_Oct_2008.pdf.
Key Academic Papers
The Design of Government Guarantees for Bank Bonds: Lessons from the Recent Financial
Crisis (Levy and Schich 2010) – Report comparing the various credit guarantee schemes
implemented by governments around the world in response to the GFC.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Levy_and_Schich_2010_0.pd
f.
The Impact of Liability Guarantees on Dutch Credit Spreads (Leal 2011) – Academic paper
investigating the effect of the Dutch Credit Guarantee Scheme on the credit spreads of Dutch
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banks.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Leal_Impact_Liability_Guara
ntees_Dutch_Credit_Spreads_March_2011.pdf.
The Pricing of Government-Guaranteed Bank Bonds (Levy and Zaghini 2010) – Academic
paper describing the evolution and pattern of bond issuance across countries to assess the
effects
of
credit
guarantee
schemes.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Levy_Zaghini_Pricing_Govt_
Guaranteed_Bank_Bonds_2010.pdf.
Reports/Assessments
BIS Papers – No. 48: An assessment of financial sector rescue programmes (Bank for
International Settlements 2009) – Report comparing the various government interventions
implemented in response to the global financial crisis, including the Dutch credit guarantee
scheme.
https://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap48.pdf.
State Aid: Overview of decisions and on-going in-depth investigations of Financial
Institutions in Difficulty (European Commission 2016) – State Aid document assessing and
comparing various government interventions enacted in the EU in response to the global
financial
crisis.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/EC_State_Aid_Overview_Dec
isions_Financial_Institutions_2016.pdf.

Copyright 2015, 2016, 2020 © Yale University. All rights reserved. To order copies of this
material or to receive permission to reprint any or all of this document, please contact the
Yale Program for Financial Stability at ypfs@yale.edu.

824

